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Abstract Fertility has unanimously declined across the entire post-communist
region. This study explores the variation in fertility trends over time among these
countries and assesses to what degree three explanations are applicable: second
demographic transition (SDT), postponement transition (PPT) or reaction to the
economic crisis. Moreover, on the basis of SDT and PPT theoretical tenets, as well
as descriptive evidence, the economic context is hypothesized to be linked to two
processes of fertility decline conversely. The results show that no one theoretical
explanation is sufﬁcient to explain the complex fertility declines across the entire
post-communist region from 1990 to 2003. In some countries, a great part of the
decline in fertility occurred before signiﬁcant postponement of childbearing began,
which indicates that the dramatic decline was due to stopping behavior or post-
ponement of higher order births. Postponement of ﬁrst births, either through PPT or
SDT processes, greatly contributed to fertility decline in a small number of coun-
tries. Pooled cross-sectional time-series analyses of age-speciﬁc birthrates conﬁrm
that these two distinct processes are present and show that the economic crisis
explanation has explanatory power for declining birth rates. In contrast, logistic
regressions show that the likelihood of postponing childbirth increases with
improved economic conditions. These results conﬁrm the importance of taking the
economic context into account when discussing explanations for fertility decline.
More speciﬁcally, the results indicate that the severity and duration of economic
crisis, or absence thereof, inﬂuenced the extent and manner in which fertility
declined.
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As of 2004, 15 countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) have entered lowest-low fertility at least once,
1 and all FSU and CEE
countries have experienced a remarkable decline in fertility since the onset of
transition from communism. The driving force behind this decline remains
debatable. To date, the literature offers evidence that worsening economic
conditions contributed to the decline in fertility (e.g., UN ECE 2000; Cornia and
Paniccia ` 1998; Kohler and Kohler’s 2002 macro-data analysis). However, other
studies found no evidence in support of the economic crisis explanation (e.g.,
Kharkova and Andreev 2000; Kohlman and Zuev 2001; Kohler and Kohler’s 2002
micro-data analysis). Rather, researchers have turned to demographic theory and
argue that the decline is evidence of Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa’s (1986) second
demographic transition (SDT) (Zakharov and Ivanova 1996; Vishnevskii 1999),
while others suggest that the presence of lowest-low fertility in the region can be
called a ‘‘postponement transition’’ (Kohler et al. 2002).
This paper makes two arguments: First, different processes underlie the fertility
declines across the post-communist region
2 as well as across the years of transition
from communism: postponement of childbearing on the one hand and a decline in
higher order births on the other. Research on the declining fertility rates of the post-
communist countries has not adequately distinguished between countries and time
periods according to important differences in these underlying processes, which has
resulted in a conﬂation of explanations and obscured the links between applicable
theories and discrete empirical situations. The second argument is that both
postponement and stopping behavior are differentially linked to the economic
context: improving economic conditions is linked to postponement of childbearing
and stopping behavior is linked to deteriorating economic conditions.
In this analysis, descriptive analyses do not demonstrate conditions amenable to a
SDT, according to its theory, across the entire post-communist region, regardless of
the universal presence of some SDT symptoms. Furthermore, postponement of
childbirth appears to explain the lion’s share of fertility decline in no more than ﬁve
of the post-communist countries studied here. Although conditions were not
conducive to a SDT in the ﬁrst years of transition from communism in a few
countries, substantial economic recovery and postponement of childbirth had begun
by the mid-1990s. Regression analyses demonstrate that distinct processes are
associated with different countries and that the economic context is related to the
1 This paper follows the Kohler et al. (2002) classiﬁcation of lowest-low fertility as any total fertility rate
(TFR) below 1.3. TFR refers to the average number of children a woman would have had, if she lives
until the end of her childbearing years and fulﬁlls childbearing according to the current age-speciﬁc birth
rates.
2 In the descriptive analyses, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are included. In the regression analyses, a
restricted sample is used for reasons discussed later, in which the majority of the Central Asian Republics
are excluded. Throughout the entire paper, countries of the former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia) and
Albania are not discussed due to missing data; nor is the former East Germany included for reasons also
discussed later.
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123speciﬁc process that drove each decline in fertility. Having countries in the sample
that experienced both processes of fertility decline as well as both extremes in
economic contexts strengthens these ﬁndings.
A few limitations of this study must be acknowledged. First, the task of
determining whether postponement of childbirth is due to a postponement transition
(PPT), associated with economic uncertainty, or rather the SDT, associated with
increased opportunities, value shifts and economic growth, is not attempted here.
Rather, the study attempts to identify whether and when either one is a possible
explanation. Distinguishing between these two underlying mechanisms of post-
ponement requires a more ﬁne-tuned instrument than a macro-data analysis. This
research operates at the macro-level to supplement the micro-data research that is
more common in the literature and to offer a contextual analysis of the conditions
under which 1) fertility was likely to decrease to a greater degree and 2) signiﬁcant
postponement more likely to occur. Not only is an aggregate analysis especially
appropriate when studying transitions due to macro-level changes, individual
experiences are linked to factors operating in the larger institutional context and not
inﬂuenced solely by micro-level factors (Spielauer et al. 2005).
The second limitation is that this analysis is restricted to analyzing short-term
causes of fertility decline. The comprehensive cultural and institutional changes that
occurred during the latter half of the twentieth century across the region are
assumed to have had an impact on fertility behavior. However, clariﬁcation is still
needed on possible short-term causes such as the role of the economic crisis.
This paper contributes to the debate by systematically reviewing both causal and
outcome indicators in light of what we would expect to see given the most popular
theoretical explanations. Furthermore, it addresses the recent competing explanation
of a PPT, as well as links postponement explicitly to the economic context and
explains the decline beyond what postponement can account for. To the best of my
knowledge, no other research has attempted to comprehensively discuss these
explanations and consider their connection to economic contexts, either theoreti-
cally or empirically, even though economic conditions are either an implicit or
explicit part of each explanation. The arguments posited in this paper are, however,
implied in existing literature, particularly in Sobotka’s (2002, 2003) work in which
he found evidence of two distinct fertility trends within the region. He also found
some evidence of a positive association between mean age at ﬁrst birth and
improved economic conditions. This paper seeks to conﬁrm the opposite relation-
ship as well, in regards to a decline in age-speciﬁc fertility rates, and to more
concretely tie empirical ﬁndings to disparate theoretical strands in the literature that
have not been considered comprehensively. This study therefore contributes to the
literature on the post-communist fertility decline, but also to literature on fertility
declines more generally since it has relevance to SDT and PPT theories. Moreover,
this study also covers a range of post-communist countries and years beyond what is
included in other analyses. A ﬁnal unique contribution of this paper is that it
explicitly analyzes the complementarity between the economic context and different
processes of fertility decline.
In the next section, the literature on fertility decline is discussed and economic
changes in the post-communist region after the fall of the Soviet Union are brieﬂy
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among the post-communist countries and the plausibility of different explanations.
The fourth section discusses the analytical models and results of regression analyses
that determine the links between economic conditions and both fertility decline and
postponement. The ﬁfth section brieﬂy discusses the ﬁndings and concludes.
Review of Literature and the Post-Communist Context
The debate in fertility research of developed countries currently involves two major
theoretical perspectives: those that focus on ideational forces and those that focus on
economic forces. Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa’s (1986) SDT leads the ideational
literature. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2004) argue that a desire for self-actualization
has become predominant and was fueled by three revolutions: (1) a contraceptive
revolution, which permits postponement of childbearing; (2) a sexual revolution,
which broke the boundaries that kept sexual activity within marriage; (3) a gender
revolution, which allowed women to no longer be subservient to men or biology.
All three of these revolutions combined re-orientated values and were said to
occur ‘‘during the peak years of economic growth’’ (p. 5). The SDT theory
dictates that families will gradually become smaller due to greater individualism
and post-materialism, which are associated with increased urbanization and post-
industrialization. Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006, p. 669) further describe the forces
at work as ‘‘not solely the outcomes of changing socioeconomic conditions or
rising female employment, but equally the expression of secular and anti-
authoritarian sentiments of better-educated men and women who held an
egalitarian world view, placed greater emphasis on Maslow’s (1954) ‘higher
order needs’ (i.e., self-actualization, individualistic and expressive orientations,
need for recognition), and, to use Inglehart’s term (1990), had stronger
‘postmaterialist’ political orientations.’’ The reaction to these forces includes a
list of changes in life course events of young adults, including postponement of
union formation and childbearing, as well as increased non-marital cohabitation
and childbirth. The resulting demographic outcome is fertility well below
population replacement level.
Demographic research has primarily concentrated on the symptoms of SDT
rather than the causal elements within the theory. This strategy is sound when
research involves OECD countries in which continued economic growth and
stability are given conditions. Indeed, the references to both Maslow and Inglehart
indicate a stage of personal evolution that is conditional upon material needs no
longer being the main focus in life. This ranking of needs is clearly stated by
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2004, p. 8), where they argue that Maslow’s (1954) higher
order needs can only be expressed once material preoccupations end and ﬁnancial
security is established. However, in many national contexts, economic conditions
may be quite different.
Had the high hopes for market transformation been unanimously realized after
the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the post-communist fertility narrative might
have nicely paralleled the scenario involving affective value shifts as described. The
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123elimination of almost complete redistribution would have resulted in more people
being able to accumulate wealth and realize individual desires, expression, and
lifetime goals through greater autonomy and increased consumption choices. While
the break with totalitarian regimes provided further opportunity for greater
individualism, it also cohered with the anti-establishment sentiments that have
historically brought about increasing heterogeneity in the timing of major life course
events. However, the restructuring of the communist economies and governments,
in many cases, resulted in economic crises that may have prohibited ascension to
post-materialism and self-actualization.
Not only was the macro-environment unstable, breeding uncertainty, but for the
ﬁrst time in the collective memory of individuals across the region, severe poverty
engulfed millions (World Bank 2000; Klugman et al. 2002). Income inequality also
grew: the average Gini coefﬁcient in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
rose from 0.26 in the late 1980s to 0.43, whereas in CEE the change was from 0.25 to
0.30 (UNICEF 2001). Not only did real wages fall in the ﬁrst years of the transition,
but wages were neither always paid in full nor on time (Gimpelson 2001). But given
the uncertainty of ﬁnding a new job and that social beneﬁts were often provided by
the enterprise themselves, employees continued to work for drastically cut wages
(Blanchard 1997). In the midst of these changes inﬂation, and in many countries
hyperinﬂation, occurred. Changes in the consumer price index reveal that almost all
of the FSU countries’ annual price index increased[1000% during the 1990s. Only
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia avoided inﬂation in the
triple digits. Under these conditions of increased poverty and inequality, as well as
decreased consumption power, conditions do not appear to have been amenable for a
postmaterialist value shift to have occurred in many countries.
Most prominent in the economic discussion is Becker’s (1960, 1981; Hotz et al.
1997) micro-economic theory of the family. The economic theory of fertility can be
summarized as focusing on the costs of children, which are mediated by household
income. Costs are considered both directly, in which the beneﬁts of a child are
weighed against the costs, and indirectly, which includes costs related to lost
opportunities. Not surprisingly, widespread economic deterioration during the
transition from communism encouraged an intuition that the economic crisis might
be related to declining fertility in the region. Indeed, researchers have paid explicit
tribute to the transition experience by directly linking the post-communist transition
and the correlated economic crisis to the decline in fertility. Cornia and Paniccia `
(1998) found a relationship between economic conditions, as well as family related
services and policies, and fertility for the early years of the transition. Their results
conﬁrm the importance of the loss of resources that was brought about by structural
change. The UN Economic Commission (2000) for Europe found that the decline in
income put downward pressure on fertility for ten post-communist countries from
1989 to 1998.
Other researchers focused on explanations related speciﬁcally to the transition
from communism to capitalism. Sobotka (2002) argues that the ‘‘socialist
greenhouse,’’ which encompasses a broad range of socialist institutions from the
labor market to family/work conciliation policies, artiﬁcially kept fertility rates high
during the decades in which they would have declined, as in the case of Western
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changes in this region through the lens of developmental idealism. Similar to the
tenets of SDT theory, they argue that norms have shifted in the region; in this case
however, the shift is due to adopting norms and behaviors of a model that is
perceived as more modern and successful such as the Western European and North
American model. Frejka (2008) sidesteps the issue of crisis versus culture in his
recent essay by claiming that both economic and ideational explanations are part
and parcel of the main explanation, which is broadly the transition to capitalism. His
argument allows both frameworks to coincide in our understanding of the fertility
decline—as well as numerous other factors that have as of yet been unaccounted for
(welfare state change, increased consumerism, etc.). However, other researchers
(e.g., Zakharov 2008) clearly still argue against the validity of the economic crisis
explanation and argue in favor of the SDT explanation.
Another valuable contribution by Frejka (2008) is his discussion of the ambiguity
of the economic crisis explanation. He claims that ‘‘by default, economic
determinants were understood to fall within the ‘crisis’ category’’ (p. 161). He
also conceded the difﬁculty of separating those factors that are solely related to
crisis from those traditional economic factors that would operate in a stable
economy (p. 164). For example, ‘‘competition in the labor market, job insecurity,
and rising costs of children’’ (p. 160) are all economic factors associated with
capitalism in general and can all be studied discretely in that context. But in the case
of economic crisis, we would expect these myriad economic factors to be at work
simultaneously. Most simply, the economic crisis explanation might be understood
as a rendition of Becker’s direct cost mechanism insofar as we focus on the dramatic
devaluation and loss of resources during the transition. This mechanism already has
been contextualized, as in the work of the Myrdals’ (Myrdal and Myrdal 1934,
summarized in English in Gustafsson 2002) Crisis in the Population Question in
which they argue that during the Great Depression people sought to have the highest
standard of living possible to them and that when the costs of childbearing were too
high, fertility continued to decline. Another contextual explanation is Easterlin’s
(1976) thesis: a conﬂict between aspirations and resources will reduce the
willingness of a couple to have children. Easterlin grounds aspirations in terms of
‘‘relative afﬂuence,’’ which refers not to the afﬂuence of other people in a cohort,
but to the afﬂuence of a person’s family of orientation. If current resources cannot
sustain the aspirations an individual has developed over time, childbearing is
limited. This perspective may be particularly applicable to post-communist
countries, considering that during transition to a market economy the bottom
dropped out of previously stable economic terrain.
Exacerbating the economic crisis was the cut in social spending across many
post-communist countries. An important omission in this paper is a discussion on
the impact of deteriorating state support to households during transition. Because
there is extensive variation in levels of support not only among the countries but
within each country over time, this factor requires its own analysis. Sufﬁce to say
that the loss of state and ﬁrm-sponsored family services (Fajth 1999) may have
greatly increased reconciliation difﬁculties between work and family roles as well as
opportunity costs.
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123Although the relationship between Becker’s opportunity costs and declining
fertility usually accompanies increased female labor force participation, the
transition saw a retreat in women’s labor force participation as well as an
overrepresentation of women among the unemployed (European Foundation 2005).
Economic uncertainty was likely rampant during transition (Bhaumik and Nugent
2002; Kreyenfeld 2005). Ranjan (1999) models the relationship between fertility
behavior and income uncertainty in the context of the FSU and CEE countries; this
study demonstrated that postponing fertility until a later time is optimal during times
of economic uncertainty due to the irreversibility of the decision. Rindfuss et al.
(1978) found that uncertainty due to social change in general can also play a role in
fertility decisions by looking at the fertility rates of white and black women in the
segregated South of the US after the Brown versus Board of Education ruling in
1954 de-segregated the school system. They found an immediate decrease in births
following this ruling. Finally, other causal mechanisms that have been the focus of
micro-level research such as social capital (Bu ¨hler and Philipov 2005; Philipov et al.
2006), social anomie (Philipov et al. 2006), and speciﬁc coping strategies such as
extra sources of sustenance (Bu ¨hler 2004) and informal work situations (Perelli-
Harris 2006) also may ﬁt within the broader economic crisis explanation. Given
these various arguments connecting economic conditions to fertility behavior, and
since it is true that economic conditions were related to both the crisis and market
reform, this paper explicitly considers the economic explanation as encompassing
the various economic explanations of fertility decline. In keeping with this purpose
is the decision to analyze economic and fertility changes at the aggregate level
rather than at the micro-level, which would be more appropriate to assess the
contribution of single economic factors discretely.
A recent theoretical addition to the debate over low fertility rates, which bridges
the literature on post-communist demographic studies and research on lowest-low
fertility in Europe, is Kohler et al.’s (2002) study. They pooled European and
formerly communist countries that have entered lowest-low fertility and found
evidence of a ‘‘postponement transition’’ (PPT). At the time of their analysis, 3
countries in Southern Europe, 5 in CEE and 6 in the FSU had lowest-low fertility
levels. They found this low TFR level to be due to postponement in childbearing,
which distorts the TFR and is a rational reaction to uncertainty originating in the
labor market. Moreover, at the aggregate level, changes in the timing of childbirth
and lower quantum were found to be reinforcing, due to feedback effects and
institutional incentives. This paper is notable in the context of the current research
for two reasons: (1) the authors propose a causal mechanism behind postponement
that is substantively different than the causal mechanism behind postponement in
the SDT theory, and; (2) by pooling Southern European countries with FSU and
CEE countries, the authors are implicitly proposing that declines in the latter
countries are not particular to the experience of transition from communism or
severe economic crisis, but only to more general economic uncertainty. The extent
to which this proposed framework is a major competing explanation is debatable,
but its presence in the debate is not (See, e.g., Frejka and Sardon 2003).
The literature, therefore, yields three distinct arguments to explain fertility
decline in the post-communist countries: SDT, PPT and economic crisis. Table 1
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of these frameworks. The main points relevant to these three explanations are
summarized, as well as their commonalities and differences. SDT is a theory of
cultural change to explain the presence of permanent below-replacement level
fertility or postponement of childbearing. PPT is a theory of rational action and
feedback effects to explain period fertility levels that have fallen to lowest-low
levels. The economic crisis explanation encompasses economic theories of fertility
behavior and has arisen as a somewhat ad-hoc explanation in response to the events
in the post-communist region. The main motivation behind SDT is self-realization
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004, p. 3). The main motivation behind PPT is delaying
long-term decisions due to uncertainty. The main motivation in the economic crisis
explanation is preoccupation with material needs, which is played out according to
many economic explanations. Both SDT and PPT manifest themselves in fertility
patterns through signiﬁcant postponement of childbirth, whereas we would expect to
see less postponement of childbirth and more stopping behavior according to the
economic crisis explanation. In other words, people may have chosen to have fewer
children than they would have had if the economic crisis did not occur because
securing material needs became a higher priority than fulﬁlling a desired family
size. According to the PPT theory, people may choose to have fewer children, but
more importantly, they wait to have children, as a rational reaction to economic
uncertainty. Finally, SDT links postponement behavior to increased opportunity for
self-actualization due to the increasing array of options and affective value shifts
that accompany economic stability and growth.
Two more commonalities exist between SDT and PPT that are not reﬂected in the
table. First is the importance of adaptation effects—‘‘life course choices feed back
onto value orientations, either to reinforce or to alter them’’ (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn
2004, p. 13)—or social feedback effects (Kohler et al. 2002), which suppress
already low fertility and may be distinct from the motivations for the original
decline. Both of these elements offer explanations that may explain why fertility has
not recovered to pre-transition or pre-crisis levels after some countries have
experienced economic recovery. Moreover, they allude to the possibility of one
driving force being replaced by another over time, which is another reason this
analysis takes a ‘‘when/when not’’ perspective rather than an ‘‘either/or’’ perspec-
tive. For example, it may be that the economic crisis explanation explains the
decline in fertility only until the point at which economic recovery relieved the
pressure on individuals and, henceforth, normative or cultural change—brought
Table 1 Theoretical diagram of explanations for fertility decline
Economic crisis
explanation
Postponement transition Second demographic
transition
Economic context Crisis Transition/stability Stability
Fertility process Stopping behavior/postponement
of higher order births
Postponement of childbirth Postponement
of childbirth
Motivation behind
family-planning
Material needs prioritization Uncertainty Self-actualization
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123about by lower fertility and broader social changes—became the driving force
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002).
The second commonality is the emphasis placed on tertiary education in SDT
and PPT. In SDT theory, women’s choices and autonomy increase as female
tertiary education enrollment increases, leading to a disruption of women’s
traditional roles in the family. Prolonged education becomes a delaying force for
major life course events such as family formation as well as an inﬂuential force on
values. PPT theorists, however, argue that with labor market uncertainty, higher
education enrollment increases not only as an investment strategy for labor market
success, but also as an alternative strategy to entering the job market when youth
unemployment is high (Kohler et al. 2002). As we would expect, the authors
found that tertiary education enrollment for women increased the most in those
countries in which signiﬁcant postponement of ﬁrst birth occurred. But because
the authors point out that the economic crisis might encourage continued
education rather than labor market entrance while also suppressing fertility, the
role of higher education in fertility decline becomes ambiguous. Hence, although
higher education enrollment rates will be commented upon in the descriptive
analyses, these rates are not discussed further in terms of major explanatory forces
of declining fertility.
A ﬁnal consideration in distinguishing between shifts in fertility behavior and
their respective explanations is why the economic crisis would not also impact the
decision to have a ﬁrst child, which would likely lead to postponement. Indeed, PPT
theory argues that economic uncertainty would induce postponement of the ﬁrst
birth. The literature on the post-communist region does not provide a link between
continued early childbearing and the economic crisis. However, Perelli-Harris
(2005) found that women still had the ﬁrst child at a young age in Ukraine because
of traditional norms. This evidence presents a counterfactual to the SDT theory, in
which we see that although fertility decreased dramatically, ideational change has
not been paired with postponement. One other theoretical basis for understanding
the relationship between continued early childbearing and economic crisis is
Friedman et al.’s (1994) ‘‘uncertainty reduction strategy’’ in which women who
experienced obstacles to alternative life paths continued the traditional early
childbearing pattern because it provided certainty during an uncertain time.
Characterizing Fertility Decline in the Former Eastern Europe and Soviet
Union
The ﬁrst purpose of this paper is to enhance our understanding of the compatibility
of major explanations or theories with empirical evidence, keeping context in mind.
The descriptive analysis is structured in response to the three major competing
explanations: SDT, PPT and economic crisis. The ﬁrst part therefore refers to the
likelihood of SDT in this region. The second part focuses on whether signiﬁcant
postponement of childbirth occurred in each country, whereas the third part
examines the timing of postponement onset and its contribution to overall fertility
decline. These three sections offer descriptive information that allow us to establish
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PPT may have been in force, and where and when the economic context and no
signiﬁcant postponement of childbirth rules out SDT or PPT explanations.
To put the recent fertility changes in a historical context, Table 2 shows changes
in fertility behavior over the last decades. TFR almost halved during this time, with
the majority of the decrease taking place after the end of the Soviet Union. What
this table fails to convey, due to simplicity, is that many countries experienced small
increases in TFR during the 1980s. This is thought to be due to pro-natalist policies
and programs that were implemented during the 1980s to increase fertility
(Zakharov and Ivanova 1996; UN ECE 2000).
Many similar demographic changes occurred across countries in the sample. For
example, the average age at ﬁrst marriage increased during the 1990s in every
country. Adolescent live births decreased in every country, even though many
countries experienced a brief increase in adolescent births during the ﬁrst few years
of transition. Also worth noting is the considerable increase in live births to non-
married women. The average increase in the share of non-marital births to total
births across the region was 20%, with Estonia leading the ranks with a 33%
increase and Turkmenistan with the lowest increase of 7% (if we exclude the
Central Asian Republics, the lowest increase was found in Ukraine at 10%). Not
Table 2 TFR from 1970 to
2000
Source: TransMONEE 2006
Database, UNICEF IRC,
Florence, and the Council of
Europe‘s Demographic
Yearbook (2003)
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000
Armenia 3.2 2.3 2.6 1.1
Azerbaijan 4.7 3.2 2.6 1.9
Belarus 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.3
Bulgaria 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.3
Czech Republic 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.3
Estonia 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.4
Georgia 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.5
Hungary 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.3
Kazakhstan 3.4 2.9 2.7 1.8
Kyrgyzstan 4.9 4.1 3.6 2.4
Latvia 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.2
Lithuania 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.4
Poland 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.3
Moldova 2.6 2.4 2.4 1.3
Romania 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.3
Russian 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.2
Slovakia 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.3
Slovenia 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.3
Tajikistan 5.9 5.6 5.1 3.1
Turkmenistan 6.0 4.9 4.2 2.3
Ukraine 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.2
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.8 4.1 2.6
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3 All of the
ﬁndings thus far systematically describe indicators of SDT. Moreover, some
postponement of childbirth can be observed in increases of mother’s age at ﬁrst
birth, which is a crucial symptom of a SDT as it relates to fertility.
Despite the smoking gun pointed towards SDT, these symptoms could be related
to a PPT due to economic uncertainty. Conversely, they could also indicate a
disruption of most life course events brought about by the social and economic
disruption. Research on single countries has pointed to the fact that many symptoms
associated with SDT may in fact be driven by other forces (see, e.g., Perelli-Harris
2005 on Ukraine; Gerber and Cottrell 2006 on Russia; Rotariu 2006 on Romania).
Establishing the link between demographic change and SDT requires more than
simply the presence of interconnected demographic changes or a logical sequencing
of these changes.
4 Rather, we must be able to connect the context in which these
changes occur, or actual ideational change, to demographic changes. While it is not
possible to study ideational change for many of the countries in the region, we can
assess the conditions under which SDT is argued to occur. Therefore, I offer other
information to characterize the context in which these changes occurred and shed
light on whether SDT can compete in this context with the PPT thesis. Speciﬁcally,
the contextual indicator that I argue offers a powerful clue is whether mortality was
under control at the time of fertility decline.
Mortalityrates arerelevanttoSDTtheory;accordingtovandeKaa(2002),‘‘Inthe
second transition fertility and mortality are both strongly inﬂuenced by normative
changes in advanced industrialized societies’’ (p. 8). He expected the value shifts that
take place in a SDT to improve health behavior, but that improvements in longevity
would probably lag behind changes in fertility rates. We have yet to see this
improvement in many post-communist countries and van de Kaa’s statement can
hardly be considered an accurate characterization of the post-communist context in
which mortality rates signiﬁcantly deviated from long-term trends (Cornia and
Paniccia ` 1998; Shkolnikov et al. 1998), despite incremental increases in some
mortality rates since the 1960s (Shkolnikov et al. 2004). However, no direct
relationshipbetweenmortalityandfertilitycanbeassumedsincethegreatestincrease
in mortality during the transition from communism occurred for men past the age of
usual family formation (Shkolnikov et al. 2004). The increase in mortality rates
during the concurrent decline in fertility is not important solely because it deﬁes SDT
theorists’ expectations, but also because it qualiﬁes each country’s transition
experience. Fertility declines that have led to below replacement level fertility and
currently to lowest-low fertility have historically occurred in high-income countries,
characterized by a nation-wide ‘‘post-materialist’’ individualistic state that leads to
SDT (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006), a context in which longevity is on the rise.
Therefore, itis afair assumptionthatmortalitylevelswould continue to improveor at
least maintain stable levels under conditions that would be suitable to a SDT.
3 For more information about these widespread changes, see Sobotka’s (2002) detailed work on many of
the post-communist countries.
4 See Sobotka et al. (2003) for a discussion on the three conceptualizations of SDT they discern in the
literature.
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123Longevitydidnotincreaseforthemajorityofthepost-communistcountriesand,in
fact,mortalityratesdeclinedalongwithfertilityinonlyafewcases.Figure 1displays
concurrent mortality and fertility trends to demonstrate how the trajectories
complement each other for three countries that represent major differences in
trajectories (See Figs. 5, 6, 7 in Appendix 1 for the remaining countries). The Czech
RepublicrepresentsGroup1,alsoincludingHungary,Poland,SlovakiaandSlovenia,
in which only a minimal increase in mortality rates occurred for the entire population
and in which mortality declined along with fertility for the remaining years of
transition.Allremainingcountriesexperiencedsigniﬁcantincreasesinmortalityafter
the transition to a market economy. Some variation among these countries exists:
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania form Group 2 in which
considerable increases in mortality rates occurred while fertility rates plummeted,
but later recovered to pre-transition mortality levels. Russia represents Group 3,
including Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan all of which have
eitheronlytentativelyachievedstablemortalityratesorhavenotatall.Ingeneral,and
particularly in regards to Estonia, Russia and Armenia, the point at which mortality
peaked and began to decline coincides with a shift in fertility trends in which the
declines markedly reduced speed; these parallel shifts point to contextual forces.
In summary, this indicator demonstrates that conditions in the FSU, Romania and
Bulgaria differed enough from the CEE countries in the early 1990s that they were
not able to keep mortality rates stable during the initial years of transition from
communism. As mentioned, the relationship between mortality and fertility trends is
not argued here to be causal; merely, the implication of mortality instability is that
only the ﬁve countries of Group 1 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia) could be characterized as having conditions amenable to a SDT or post-
materialist revolution in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, while conditions for those
countries in Group 2 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) appear
amenable only in the second half of the 1990s and conditions in the remaining
countries (group 3) appear unsuitable for a SDT until at least 2003.
Besides a context that is in line with the theoretical tenets of SDT, we would also
expect evidence of the major SDT symptom associated with fertility decline:
postponement of childbearing. However, postponement may be brought on by an
altogether different motivation than argued in SDT. A ‘‘postponement transition’’
(Kohler et al. 2002) might occur if families decide to wait to have children because
of socioeconomic insecurity. Contextually, this thesis aligns with the post-
communist experience; therefore, there are no major theoretical conﬂicts with
applying this explanation to the complete range of post-communist countries.
However, this thesis clearly relates the issue of low fertility to postponement and its
distortion of the period fertility measure that has deﬁned lowest-low fertility.
Therefore, the extent to which signiﬁcant postponement occurred must be
systematically assessed.
Kohler et al. (2002) found evidence of a PPT for countries ranging from Southern
Europe to Russia, combining countries that have not experienced recent economic
crises with countries that have only recently achieved economic stability; by
implication, this effectively rules out the economic crisis explanation for fertility
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123decline. Not only is there great variation in the socioeconomic contexts in these
authors’ sample, but there is also great variation in the timing of descent into lowest-
low fertility: Greece, Italy and Spain slowly declined from 1985 to 1999, losing
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Group 3: Demographic Changes in Russia
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Fig. 1 Three countries representing three different patterns of fertility and mortality trajectories. Source:
Author‘s calculations based on WHO Health for All DB and UNICEF‘s TransMONEE DB
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123between 0.2 and 0.4 TFR, while in the same time period the CEE countries lost
between 0.5 and 1 TFR and the FSU countries between 0.8 to 1.4 TFR. These
dramatic differences are not solely due to different starting levels of TFR and invite
further research into speciﬁc aspects of the post-communist decline.
The next descriptive analyses explore to what extent postponement of childbirth is
a major pattern in these countries during the ﬁrst years of transition, as well as offer
some indication ofhowimportant this postponement hasbeen toachieving the depths
towhich fertilityhadfallenbythe endof the 1990s. As the largest decrease infertility
occurred in the 20–24 year old population, postponement seems a likely culprit.
However, the 25–29 year old age group in most countries continually mirrored the
younger trend, even if to a slightly less intensity, rather than began to increase by the
end of the 1990s as we would expect to see for postponement within cohorts.
5 Birth
rates to 30–34 year old women also stayed stable after an initial decline, rather than
increasing in the late 1990s, which we would likely see if women had expected to
have children at ages 25–29 and postponed until their early 30s. This is not to say that
recuperation did not happen, but that birth rates still declined enough at these ages to
offset the importance of any recuperation to the overall trends.
A common method of separating the impact of tempo on period fertility rates is
Bongaarts and Feeny’s (1998) ‘‘adjusted total fertility rate.’’ This measure has
proven a useful tool for a truer construction of what the period fertility rate is
supposed to offer. However, this measure is less useful if postponement is not later
matched by recuperation (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000), as just discussed. In the
present analysis, the adjusted fertility rate is not used as a measure; this is partly due
to the fact that these rates have already been provided elsewhere for the countries
where there is evidence of postponement over the duration of the transition. I also
do not calculate the adjusted total fertility rate because the purpose here is to merely
show whether signiﬁcant postponement exists at all in the time period studied, the
intensity of postponement and if it coincided with the initial decline in fertility
rather than estimate what the TFR would be if tempo is removed from its
calculation. Instead, a postponement ratio, as used by Lesthaeghe and Neidert
(2006), is used to determine the degree of postponement that has taken place.
However, where these authors constructed their ratio by summing age-speciﬁc
fertility rates above age 30 and dividing by the sum of age-speciﬁc fertility rates for
ages 20–29, the formula is altered here to reﬂect the post-communist context in
which women have the majority of their children at a relatively young age.
Therefore, the ratio used here is the sum of live births to women ages 25? over the
number of live births to women ages 15–24.
If postponement explains the steep decline in fertility rates in the early 1990s, an
increase in the birth rates of higher age groups is inevitable after a time lag. Most
countries studied here at the onset of transition had an almost equal ratio (located
between 0.8 and 1.2) of children born to women ages 15–24 to all women 25 years
and more, demonstrating the young age structure of childbearing in these countries.
The exceptions are the countries that still had a prevalence of high-parity births at
5 Figures depicting the slopes of age-speciﬁc birth rates by country are excluded for reasons of space, but
available upon request.
206 S. Billingsley
123the transition onset, demonstrated through a high ratio (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan: 1.5, Tajikistan: 1.9, and Turkmenistan: 2.3), and Bulgaria, which had an
unusually low ratio of 0.7 at the beginning of the transition. Figure 2 shows the
changes in the postponement ratio from 1989 to 2003 on similar scales for better
comparison. The ﬁve countries that stood out in the ﬁrst descriptive analysis again
are distinct from the others. More heterogeneity among the remaining countries is
evident in regards to the postponement ratio; therefore, four different ﬁgures that
represent the patterns appear in Fig. 2 below.
The initial distinction between group one and the remaining countries is one in
which a decline in the ratio is nonexistent or negligible, whereas the others all
experienced a decline in the ratio at some point. The Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia form a distinct group because all experienced
signiﬁcant postponement. They all began at 1 or lower and the lowest ratio by 2003
was 1.7 in Slovakia and the highest was 3.5 in Slovenia. The postponement ratios
for the second group, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, increased to
a much lesser degree than the ﬁrst group after an initial decline. At transition onset,
the ratios varied from 0.5 to 0.9 and by 2003 the highest ratio reached was Latvia’s
at 1.6, while Bulgaria only reached 1. In fact, the Baltic states’ ratios closely parallel
each other’s throughout the time period. But although Bulgaria began at a much
lower ratio, the trajectory in terms of the magnitude of initial decline and later
increase was quite similar. The third group, including Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, experienced much more of a decline in the
initial ratios and much less of a later increase. The range in initial ratios was 0.7
(Ukraine) to 1 (Kazakhstan). All ratios decreased in the early 1990s and a few
(Kazakhstan and Moldova) decreased again in the late 1990s (in 1998 and 1999, and
in 2000, respectively). This was followed by a modest increase with ranges varying
between 0.9 in Ukraine to 1.3 in Kazakhstan by 2003. As evident in the ﬁgure,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and Russia mirror each other so closely in
their postponement ratios that separating their trajectories is difﬁcult. The ﬁnal
group consists of countries that have not experienced any notable postponement
throughout the entire transition, according to the postponement ratio: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
6 However, as mentioned
earlier in regards to some of these countries, this ratio captures more than
postponement if the fertility quantum is also high, since higher parity births are born
at later ages and a decrease in high parity births would obscure an increase in births
to older women due to postponement. Therefore, it is not as useful a tool for
capturing postponement in these latter countries as in the others in which fertility
hovers around replacement level.
The point at which postponement began may indicate how strongly it is related to
the initial decline in TFR; therefore, the earlier the postponement the more
important it should be to the decline. To determine the year of postponement onset,
this paper follows the deﬁnition set by Kohler et al. (2002) in which the year of
onset is the ﬁrst year in a consecutive three-year increase of at least 0.3 in the
average age of mother at ﬁrst birth. The following ﬁgure shows the postponement
6 Tajikistan is excluded due to missing information on age speciﬁc birth rates.
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123trend starting with the year of onset, plotted against the TFR to see at what point in
the TFR decline postponement begins.
Group 1 countries remain distinct and are again represented by the Czech
Republic in Fig. 3; their overall average onset was 1992.8. The earlier year of
postponement onset is important since it further strengthens the likelihood that
postponement contributed to low fertility levels, as the steepest decline in period
fertility occurred during the early 1990s. Slovenia in particular may well be a case in
which postponement is absolutely driving the fertility decline, as the onset of
postponement began at the very beginning of the serious decline in TFR. Overall,
these countries experienced between a 4 and 12% decrease in TFR by the time
postponement onset ofﬁcially occurred.
All other countries that experienced postponement are represented by Russia in
Fig. 3. In general, postponement began later in these countries than in Group 1
countries. Overall, these countries experienced between a 22 and 38% decrease in
TFR before postponement onset occurred. Figure 3 shows that postponement
preceded Russia’s entrance into lowest-low fertility (below 1.3). However, more
than 80% of the decline in TFR from 2 in 1989 to lowest-low levels of 1.3 preceded
the onset of postponement. In fact, postponement began around the end of the TFR
decline in Russia. See Figs. 8, 9 in Appendix 2 for the ﬁgures of all countries, except
those in which the postponement ratios did not increase at all as a general trend.
In summary, postponement of childbirth appears to be a prominent reason the
period fertility measure has declined across the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia; whereas the extent to which postponement has played a major
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123role in the decline in TFR of the remaining countries appears limited. This ﬁnding
conﬁrms that the PPT theory cannot explain fertility decline in Armenia, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Russia, although postponement may still
have been the ﬁnal push that suppressed TFR to lowest-low fertility levels. Besides
the lack of explanatory power the PPT thesis has for the majority of these lowest-low
post-communist countries, the ramiﬁcations of postponement may be different in this
region from those in Western Europe. With a later onset of childbearing, the quantum
of fertility is known to decrease (Kohler et al. 2002; Billari and Kohler 2004). The
strength of this negative association in the post-communist countries remains to be
seen; there is reason to doubt the total impact given the disparity between the degrees
of postponement discussed. According to Kohler et al., the average age of Southern
European mothers at ﬁrst birth in 1999 was 28.3 years, while the average age of
mothers in post-communist countries at ﬁrst birth in 1999 was 23.9. This difference
of almost ﬁve years puts current mothers in the post-communist countries at the same
age as mothers in Southern Europe before their PPT began. In other words, the
argument that ‘‘fertility postponed is fertility foregone’’ may not apply when
postponement occurs at a relatively young age.
Despite the simple tools used in this analysis, ﬁndings conﬁrm those of other
researchers.UsingBongaartsandFeeney’sadjustedTFR(1998),PhilipovandKohler
(2001) found a signiﬁcant difference betweenthe declines in Bulgaria and Russia and
those in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Whereas the declines were clearly
due to tempo effects in the latter cases, quantum drove the early years of decline in
Bulgaria and Russia. Sobotka (2002, 2003) found a wide variation in the contribution
of tempo to declining period fertility rates as well. These authors also attribute these
ﬁndings to the more severe economic reaction to transition in these two cases.
To summarize this descriptive exploration, three discrete country groups emerge
in this region. Due to escalating mortality rates, only ﬁve countries display conditions
amenable to a SDT throughout the entire transition: Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. These same ﬁve countries also exhibit signs of
signiﬁcant postponement of ﬁrst birth as well as fertility declines that coincide with
the increase in age at ﬁrst birth. Therefore, for ﬁve of the post-communist countries
discussed here, either SDT or a PPT may be the force behind their entire fertility
decline; as stated earlier, this analysis does not attempt to distinguish between SDT
and PPT in the cases where either might ﬁt. Research using disaggregated data may
be more able to distinguish the mechanism behind postponement.
Figure 4 summarizes the following ﬁndings. While postponement appears to be
the process behind fertility decline during most of the transition in those ﬁve
countries of Group 1, it appears to be the process behind fertility decline in only the
later half of the 1990s in the four countries of Group 2: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania.
7 These four countries appear to be a mixed-process group in which
economic crisis explanation appears to be at work in the turbulent early 1990s
because postponement was minor and conditions were not amenable to an SDT.
7 Romania also experienced signiﬁcant postponement and recovery of mortality rates, but the ratio of
age-speciﬁc births to older women over age-speciﬁc births to younger women indicates a scenario much
closer to the third group of countries.
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123However, after the mid-1990s, economic recovery, mortality stability and the
presence of substantial postponement leave room for either a SDT or PPT
explanation. Group 3 includes countries that did experience postponement by the
end of the 1990s, but because mortality rates have still not recovered, conditions
appear unlikely for SDT to be a major explanatory force for declining fertility,
leaving PPT as a likely explanation for only recent low levels of fertility. In
summary, two processes seem to be at work—postponement of childbearing and
stopping behavior—and one of these two processes characterizes the majority of the
fertility decline for two groups of countries (Groups 1 and 3), while both processes
are almost equally present in the mixed-process group (Group 2).
Including more countries and later years, this analysis conﬁrms the general
ﬁndings of Sobotka (2004): although TFR was negatively affected to some degree
by the postponement of childbirth, regional differences in period fertility still
existed even after taking postponement into account and, thus, there were at least
two pathways of fertility change for the post-communist countries. Moreover, the
data that is available shows what we would expect according to theory and past
research: the countries showing the most striking increase in higher education
enrollment rates (Group 1 countries) are the ones that also demonstrate evidence of
signiﬁcant postponement, rather than stopping behavior.
Regression Analyses
This section contributes to the study of fertility decline in the post-communist
region by analyzing whether: (1) the variation in fertility behavior can be
statistically linked to two different processes: stopping behavior and postponement
of ﬁrst birth; and (2) whether these different processes are conversely related to
economic context. Speciﬁcally, the hypotheses are as follows:
H1 The fertility declines of Group 3 were distinct from those of Group 1 and were
driven by economic crisis.
Hence, if stopping behavior drove the decreases in fertility in Group 3, then a
reduction in age speciﬁc birth rates, especially at older ages, should be evident for
Group 1
1990 2003
SDT or PPT
Group 2
3 0 0 2 0 9 9 1
ECO SDT or PPT
Group 3
ECO
3 0 0 2 0 9 9 1
ECO PPT
Fig. 4 Summary of descriptive ﬁndings. Note: Group 1 includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia; Group 2 includes Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Group 3 includes all
remaining former Soviet Union countries and Romania. SDT Second demographic transition, PPT
postponement transition and ECO economic crisis explanation
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123those countries. Moreover, if the economic crisis drove these declines in birth rates,
then the difference between the groups of countries should disappear if we account
for economic context.
H2 Postponement of childbearing drove the fertility decline of Group 1 and a
more positive economic environment encouraged this delay in childbearing.
Hence, the likelihood of experiencing postponement onset, as deﬁned in the
previous section, will be lower for countries of Group 3 than Group 1. Moreover, if
a positive economic context is related to the likelihood of postponement onset, the
difference between the two groups should be rendered statistically insigniﬁcant with
the inclusion of variables that capture the economic context.
Due to the presence of Group 2 countries, which clearly exhibited both processes
in the descriptive analyses, a static two-group categorization may not be appropriate.
Ideally, these mixed-process countries would be able to contribute to both groups
according to which process was underway by year. Unfortunately, complications
arise with this strategy
8; instead, the strategy adopted is to run the models twice,
putting these mixed-process countries ﬁrst in Group 1, then 3. If these countries truly
experienced both processes, and variation in the economic context explains these
processes, then the placement in either group should work almost equally well.
Results conﬁrm this assumption and although I present ﬁndings of only one
classiﬁcation for simplicity, the models for the additional group speciﬁcations can be
found in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 3 and Table 7 in Appendix 4.
Data and Sample
To test these hypotheses, I use cross-sectional time-series data mostly taken from
the TransMONEE database. This database ‘‘contains data related to the social and
economic situation and wellbeing of children, young people and women in CEE,
the CIS and the Baltic States (CEE/CIS).’’ It is associated with the MONEE
Project: Public Policies and Social Conditions: Monitoring the Transition in CEE
and the CIS and was initiated by UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in 1992. The
database consists of annual data received from the National Statistical Ofﬁces of
each country and uses a standardized template. I include as many post-communist
states as the data allow, excluding most Central Asian Republics (CAR), for the
13 year period of 1990–2003. The sample includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland,
8 The countries were selected into the groups according to multiple pieces of evidence, which increases
the difﬁculty of selecting one variable that would indicate a single year when a country transitioned from
crisis as a driving force of fertility decline to economic stability and postponement. When analyzing age
speciﬁc birth rates, it was possible to take the year of postponement onset or beginning of mortality
recovery, whichever happened ﬁrst, as the year in which these countries moved from Group 3 to 1. While
neither of these bases is directly endogenous to the age speciﬁc birth rate models, this basis is problematic
for determining the groups for the postponement models. Due to the lack of one clearly exogenous
variable to establish a single point in time, I did not attempt this strategy for the postponement models. It
is worth noting that the results presented in the following selection are robust to the group categorization
in which the mixed-process countries change groups over the time series in this analysis. See Tables 5 and
6 in Appendix 3.
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123Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Not included are the
Southeastern European countries of Albania and the former Yugoslavia as well
as Belarus and Latvia, due to complete lack of data for one or more variables, and
the former East Germany (GDR).
9 Although the CARs were included in the
descriptive analyses, they are not included here due to the confounding inﬂuence
of the decline in higher order births that would accompany a First Demographic
Transition.
10 Kazakhstan remained in the analysis as the TFR was already well
below 3 before the transition from communism began. Although this sample does
include a few countries that experienced conﬂict within their borders (Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Moldova) during the early years of transition, the results proved to
be robust when excluding these countries. In summary, the analysis includes 15
countries for 14 years
11 and the range in TFR at 1990 was 1.81 (Bulgaria) to 2.77
(Azerbaijan).
Measures
Five different dependent variables (DVs) are used: age-standardized live birth rates
(live births per 1,000 women) for 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34 and 35? year old
women. The majority of variables show greater within variance than between.
12 All
independent variables have been lagged by 1 year. Originally, a 2 year lag was
considered more likely, due to a 9 month gestation period; however, tests
consistently showed the relationship to be stronger with a 1 year lag.
Fertility rates are subject to non-stationarity; for this reason, I took the ﬁrst
differences of all my DVs. This solution is a viable approach as my theoretical
interest is in the changes in fertility rates caused by the explanatory variables and
not the absolute levels. Maddala’s (Maddala and Wu 1999) Fisher test for panel unit
root using the augmented Dickey–Fuller test rejected the possibility of a unit root
for all my DVs once they were transformed into ﬁrst differences. The theta score in
a random effects regression and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
for random effects revealed the adequacy of a pooled model to represent the
variance in this data. Before taking the ﬁrst differences of my DVs, a ﬁxed effects
estimator proved to be the best ﬁt, but transforming the DVs into changes in rates
rather than actual rates removed country speciﬁc effects. Moreover, the inclusion of
a control variable for the initial TFR also removes substantial ﬁxed effects. Durbin’s
M-test and the Baltagi and Li test for serial correlation in panel data indicated that
9 The former GDR is not included in the Trans MONEE database, and therefore the comparable
standardized indicators used in the analysis are not readily accessible. The former GDR would be an
interesting inclusion to this sample due to the remarkable drop in TFR during the early years of transition
(1.5 in 1990 to 0.8 in the years 1992–1995), but the contextual differences brought about by its absorption
into a wealthy country and national culture characterize its transition with speciﬁc and unusual conditions
in comparison to all other post-communist cases.
10 Nevertheless, previous models that include Kygyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan demonstrate
that the results are robust whether they are included or not.
11 There are a few years in which data is missing for a few countries within this time period.
12 Correlation charts and summary statistics are omitted for reasons of space and are available upon
request.
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123taking ﬁrst differences removed autocorrelation from this data. To deal with
heteroskedasticity, I estimated the model by using the Linearization/Huber/White/
sandwich robust estimates of variance.
13
‘‘Economic crisis’’ is represented with four variables: GDP, inﬂation, employ-
ment ratio and wage growth. The indicator used for inﬂation is the (log) ‘‘annual
percent change in consumer prices’’ (IMF World Economic Outlook 2000, 2003).
The measure for GDP is per capita and expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP).
Because the interest here is not in the absolute wealth of a country, but rather the
changes from year to year, or more speciﬁcally the decline in GDP, this indicator is
the difference in GDP from 1 year to the next. This means that the starting year of
the time series—1990—reﬂects the difference between GDP in 1990 and 1989.
Rather than focus on unemployment rates, which offer a rate based on the total
labor force, employment rates are used to better capture the inﬂuence of how many
individuals are working in relation to the total working age population, not just
those technically in the labor force. This measure should be more sensitive to
assessing women’s status since they move in and out of the labor force more often
than men for family reasons or may be more likely to not participate in the labor
force due to family reasons when the economy is performing poorly. But it also
ensures we are capturing shifts in employment levels that would also affect spouses
and, hence, are reﬂecting conditions at the household and not just individual level.
Speciﬁcally, the measure used in this analysis is an employment ratio: the number of
employed as a percent of population aged 15–59.
Real average wage growth is ‘‘a proxy for the quantity of goods and services a
money wage can buy; the real wage represents the money wage adjusted for
inﬂation.
14 Values are an index based on the value of 100 at the base year’’
(TransMONEE 2007) and, therefore, reﬂect cumulative changes in wages since the
onset of transition and not year-to-year wage growth.
The key indicator is ‘‘group,’’ which separates the countries according to the
division that emerged in the descriptive analysis. As mentioned, the intermediate
group of countries, or the mixed-process group (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania), are dealt with by: (1) placing them in analyses with Group 1
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), where a
more stable economic environment is argued to be driving postponement, (2)
placing them with Group 3 countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine), where economic crisis is
argued to have contributed to stopping behavior. The results that are displayed
are those for the best model, but results for the alternative country groupings can
be viewed in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 3 and Table 7 in Appendix 4.
Finally, I include one control variable: initial TFR. Including the fertility rate at
the starting point of the fertility decline—according to the years analyzed here—
may capture any country-speciﬁc effects such as the impact of culture on overall
13 I also attempted models based on nonlinear speciﬁcations, but without better results.
14 ‘‘IRC estimate. Consumer price index taken from EBRD (2003) Transition Report Update, 2003.
London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 2002–2003 are preliminary data.’’ (Trans
MONEE 2004).
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123fertility behavior. Moreover, it may also account for speciﬁc characteristics of
fertility behavior at certain levels of TFR that might confound the analysis.
The model is designed to be sparse; only those aspects that will conﬁrm whether
economic conditions explain changes in fertility rates are introduced into the model.
Therefore,theregressionanalyses arenottestingtheexplanatorypowerofalternative
hypotheses. Other research has included explanatory variables in the models such as
the marriage rate, age of ﬁrst birth, and divorce rate (e.g., Cornia and Paniccia ` 1998;
UN ECE 2000). These are important determinants of fertility and have themselves
beenthefociofmuchresearch.However,asthesefactorsthemselvesmaybeimpacted
by deteriorating economic conditions, they would likely introduce endogeneity into
the model. Therefore, I do not include them as explanatory or control variables.
In this analysis, the beneﬁts of having time-series data that include pre-transition
years are sacriﬁced in order to have data that covers most of the countries that were
part of the Eastern Bloc. In identifying causality, the ‘‘no cause-no effect’’ condition
(Bhrolcha ´in and Dyson 2007) is best satisﬁed by observing a single or a few cases
over long periods of time, but here it has been satisﬁed by observing the degree of
effects based on the degree of changes across many countries over a shorter period
of time, which adequately meet counterfactual criteria (Esping-Andersen and
Przeworski 2000). As such, the conclusions found here are more relevant to the
speed and intensity of fertility decline than to the occurrence of decline, since all
countries experienced a decline to some degree.
To formally test the claim that there are signiﬁcant differences between the
country groups that emerged according to the process behind the fertility decline, as
well as a mixed-process group, step-wise regressions are used. First, bivariate
regression analysis with a dummy variable separating the groups will tell us if there
is a signiﬁcant and meaningful difference between the two when regressing the
fertility measure on the groups. The descriptive evidence suggests that declines in
the fertility rates of countries of the third group will be more intense. Hence, in
Model 1 being a country of Group 3 will have a negative impact, in reference to
Group 1, on changes in fertility. Second, adding the economic indicators to this
model will indicate if economic context variables explain the differences between
the country groups. If the continued worsening of the economic situation was an
important condition under which the fertility decline was more intense or consistent,
the effect of the Group dummy should disappear. Hence, in Model 2, worsening
economic conditions should negatively impact fertility, while rendering the Group
dummy no longer signiﬁcant.
15 In other words, the ﬁrst model will conﬁrm the
overall difference between groups and show in what direction the difference is,
whereas the second model will show that the difference becomes negligible or
reversedif we take into account the economic context. The value of the secondmodel
15 One important concern over using such interrelated economic variables (GDP, inﬂation, employment
ratio and wage growth) is the extent to which multicollinearity biases my results. Indeed, the dummy
separating the two groups of countries had a correlation score of .69 with GDP. Transforming GDP into
the difference in GDP greatly relieved the collinearity between these variables. In any case, the variance
inﬂation factor (VIF) score reads 1.67, which is below the danger realm of 2.0–10 VIF score (Cohen et al.
2003) and assures that the results are not biased by multicollinearity.
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123is in seeing the change in the group dummy coefﬁcient/odds ratio between the two
models when we include the economic indicators. Therefore, the ﬁnal model is:
DFertilityit ¼ b0 þ b1typeit 1 þ b2wagegrowthit 1 þ b3empgrowthit 1
þ b4inflationit 1 þ b5DGDPit 1 þ uit
Where D indicates the change in the age speciﬁc birthrate for country i at time t.
bs are the coefﬁcients of the explanatory variables at t - 1 and u is the error term.
Finally, to further conﬁrm the distinct processes behind the fertility declines of
the two groups—and whether economic context is also related, but conversely, to
postponement—a logistic regression analyzes whether the group dummy captures
the difference in likelihood of postponement. The DV in these regressions is
dichotomous, in which 0 indicates there was no increase in the average age of
mother at ﬁrst birth and 1 indicates an increase. To conform to the idea of
postponement as a transition, the increase is considered to exist only if it is past the
point of postponement onset, as deﬁned above, to exclude the minute ﬂuctuations
both up and down in mothers’ average age at ﬁrst birth. The second model in the
logistic regression includes the same economic variables as discussed above to test
whether the same forces behind the declines in fertility are behind the increase in
mothers’ ages at ﬁrst birth when postponement had begun. Step-wise inclusion of
the economic indicators is used here as well, following the strategy outlined above.
It is expected that in Model 1, being a country of Group 3 will reduce the likelihood
of postponement; while the addition of the economic variables will render the type
dummy insigniﬁcant in Model 2 and improvements in the economic indicators will
increase the likelihood of postponement.
Results
Table 3 displays results for the linear regression models of age-speciﬁc birth rates.
Model 1 regresses the age-speciﬁc birth rates on the group dummy only. In general,
the hypothesis related to Model 1 holds: Except for the two youngest age groups, the
coefﬁcient for belonging to Group 2 is negative, meaning that the decline in births at
higher ages is greater for countries in Group 2. This coefﬁcient is statistically
signiﬁcantinthecountrygroupingforbirthsto30–34and35?yearoldwomeninthis
country grouping. It is also statistically signiﬁcant for the 25–29 year olds when the
mixed-processcountriesareincludedinGroup3,ratherthanGroup1,aswellaswhen
their contribution to the groups varies by year (See Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 3).
In the case of teen birth rates and the 20–24 year olds, the coefﬁcient for the group
dummy was consistently positive and insigniﬁcant. A positive relationship makes
senseforwomenofyoungeragesinGroup3countries;postponementismostlikelyto
suppress age-speciﬁc birth rates at younger ages and we expect to see greater
postponement in Group 1. However, these coefﬁcients are not statistically signiﬁcant
at the younger ages and, in the case of 15–19 year olds, it is particularly low.
Model 2 also displays results in line with the hypothesis: the difference in the
intensity of decline in fertility between Group 1 and Group 3 is mediated by the
economic context and especially so at older ages. The impact of the country group
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123dummy disappeared or completely reversed when the economic variables were
introduced into the model. The exception again is the younger age groups (teens and
the 20–24 year old women), in which the coefﬁcients for belonging in Group 3 have
the same direction when the economic context variables are included as when they
are not included, although their size increases.
In regards to the speciﬁc impact of these economic indicators, the results are
complex. Only in the case of live births to teens did wage growth prove to be
important. This ﬁnding was consistent across the two parallel analyses that
distribute the countries among the groupings differently (See Tables 5 and 6 in
Appendix 3). In Model 2, inﬂation consistently has the expected relationship
(negative) with birth rates of all women 20 and above, but it is signiﬁcant only for
the 20–24 and 30–34 age groups. The employment ratio also had a negative
relationship with fertility, which contradicts the crisis-related expectation that when
employment increases fertility should increase. Rather, the relationship is what we
would expect to see according to traditional economic theory: increased employ-
ment—assuming this translates into increased employment for women as well—
decreases fertility due to the indirect costs associated with childbearing. However, it
is only statistically signiﬁcant for the 30–34 year old women. GDP per capita was
signiﬁcant and had the expected relationship with all fertility outcomes except the
15–19 age group. As the economy improved in general, changes in fertility were
positive as well. The control variable, initial TFR, was signiﬁcant for women
between the ages of 20 and 34 in which the coefﬁcient was negative but its impact
diminished at higher ages.
Overall, these results demonstrate that not only does the economic context absorb
important variation in the underlying processes of fertility decline of the country
groups, but that worsening economic conditions were related in general to the
decreasing fertility rates. Where this was not the case was for the age group that
would be most impacted by postponement, rather than stopping behavior.
Logistic regressions on the likelihood of postponing childbirth are displayed in
Table 4.
16 As expected, Model 1 indicates that countries of Group 3 had a lower
odds ratio of experiencing a signiﬁcant increase in the average age of mother at ﬁrst
birth than countries of Group 1 during this time frame, demonstrating once again
that different processes occurred in these two groups during the fertility decline.
This difference reversed entirely once economic indicators were included in the
model; the odds ratio became positive, although statistically insigniﬁcant. In the
ﬁnal model, change in GDP per capita was signiﬁcant, where increases in GDP
improved the likelihood that postponement would occur. Although the employment
ratio and inﬂation did not have the expected impact on postponement, the odds
ratios are not statistically signiﬁcant, whereas the direction of wage growth is as we
would expect. Finally, this general story holds true for the alternative grouping of
countries, which is displayed in Table 7 in Appendix 4.
16 The comparison of the results for the two different country groupings reveals that including the mixed-
process countries with Group 1 does not achieve a statistically signiﬁcant model at any level; therefore,
the results for the model in which the mixed-process countries are placed in Group 2 are displayed.
However, the direction of all odds ratios is the same in the two groupings, as well as the signiﬁcance of all
other indicators in Model 2.
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123In summary, these two sets of regression analyses establish a clear distinction
between two groups of post-communist countries that appeared distinct in the
descriptive analyses. Those in Group 1 demonstrated postponement behavior,
whereas those in Group 2 demonstrated stopping behavior. The fact that the mixed-
process countries perform almost equally as well in either group, with the results
telling the same story, further reinforces the hypothesis that two processes underlie
the country group distinction. Moreover, the changes in the group dummy
coefﬁcient between Model 1 and Model 2 systematically show that the relationship
between the country grouping and the fertility measure is mediated by the economic
context. In other words, from 1990 to 2003, postponement was linked to
improvements in the economic context, whereas stopping behavior was related to
worsening economic conditions.
Discussion and Conclusions
The ﬁrst purpose of this paper was to establish that there were indeed different
processes behind declines in post-communist fertility rates. Three groups emerged
across this region. The ﬁrst group appeared to have undergone a PPT or SDT early
on in the transition from communism (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia). The second group appears to have undergone a PPT or SDT later in
the transition from communism. They experienced fertility decline before major
postponement of childbirth (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The third
group appears to have experienced postponement of childbirth, if at all, only much
later in the transition from communism and after extensive fertility decline had
already occurred (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova,
Romania, Russia and Ukraine). The countries and time periods that do not display
Table 4 Logistic regression results for postponement of childbirth, mixed-process countries categorized
as Group 3
Logistic regression postponement
M1 M2
Prob[v
2 0.0052 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared 0.0670 0.4515
Log pseudo likelihood -89.660 -52.707
Obs. 147 147
Group 0.22 (0.12)*** 1.82 (1.93)
Initial TFR 0.13 (0.20)
DReal GDP pc 1.004 (0.001)***
(log) Inﬂation 0.84 (0.13)
Employment ratio 0.99 (0.07)
Wage growth 1.02 (0.02)
Notes:*p\0.10, ** p\0.05, *** p\0.01, Robust standard errors in parentheses. Group 1 is the
reference category and includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Group 3 includes
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Russia and
Ukraine (Group 2 countries—mixed-process countries—are absorbed into Group 3 in these models)
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123strong postponement appear to have undergone a more traumatic transition in which
major health crises ensued and fertility declines were more intense. These distinct
ﬁndings, regarding the divergence among countries, conﬁrm Sobotka’s (2002)
ﬁndings as well as speciﬁc research on individual countries (e.g., Sobotka et al.
2003 on the Czech Republic; Perelli-Harris 2005 on Ukraine).
The second purpose of this study was to empirically test whether this profound
drop in fertility rates indicates a reaction to problematic transitions, or economic
crisis.Theresultsreafﬁrmresearchthathasfoundalinkbetweendepressedeconomic
conditions and declining fertility for the countries where postponement of childbirth
did not appear to play a major role in the initial decline in fertility rates. Conversely,
when the economic context was more stable, postponement was more likely to take
place. The results contribute to the empirical veriﬁcation that the economic crisis, or
its absence, mattered to the manner and intensity of fertility decline.
The framing of this study—looking beyond static country groups—accommo-
dates the dynamic reality that the economy decreases in importance to fertility
decisions according to its performance. Therefore, ﬁnding evidence of countries
moving between the two groups according to changes in the economic context
offers more support for the proposed mechanisms behind fertility decline than
would a static grouping of countries, since it renders the country grouping
mechanism less likely to be spurious.
The limitations of this study are many. First, the small sample size may have
decreased the statistical signiﬁcance of the models. Second, the approach and
modeling of this analysis are not able to accommodate long-term factors that may be
important to fertility decline. Therefore, the ﬁndings are generalizable only to the
relationship between fertility and the economic context as it varies from 1 year to
the next and, speciﬁcally, between 1990 and 2003. Finally, data on trends in parity
births for this range of countries and years is not yet available. As this data becomes
available in the future, further analyses can conclusively determine the exact
processes underlying the fertility declines.
Beyond understanding the post-communist fertility decline and whether it was
partially due to the economic crisis, the ﬁndings of this paper have implications for
SDT and PPT theories. First, the ﬁndings offer support for the theoretical tenets of
SDT theory. When the economic conditions allow for material needs to be met,
postponement of childbirth does appear more likely to occur. Because the results
support a relationship between positive economic performance and postponement,
PPT theory does not seem as robust in this context. However, given the
overwhelming social upheaval even in countries that did not experience lengthy
economic crises, the uncertainty proposed in Kohler et al.’s (2002) research may
also be a likely motivation for postponement of childbearing.
Further exploration on establishing the different motivations according to these two
theoriesisneededtopushthedebatefurther.Forinstance,theempiricalconditionsfora
PPT could be more clearly differentiated from those in which a SDT is likely. Another
areaofPPTtheoreticalreﬁnementcouldbehowincreasedtertiaryeducationenrollment
impactsfertilitydifferentlyinaPPTcontextthaninaSDTcontext.PPTtheoristscould
also enhance their theoretical claim by addressing the role of unemployment more
clearly.Someresultsinthisanalysisseemtoindicatethatfamilyformationwaseithera
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123coping mechanism for women when employment levels dropped or that there were
restrictions to continuing previous family formation patterns for those women who
managed to maintain employment. These issues and, in general, the question related to
postponement behavior and its underlying causal mechanism—economic uncertainty
(PPT) versus SDT—is best analyzed with micro-data.
A policy implication of these results is that lowest-low fertility levels in this
region are not necessarily there to stay. We have already seen this as countries have
begun to climb out of lowest-low fertility already: as of 2006, only Belarus,
Moldova, Poland and Slovakia have TFRs that remain below 1.3. In summary,
although period fertility has remained low for many years, there are indications that
with better economic conditions, families may increase their willingness to have
more children. At least this may be true for those countries of the post-communist
region in which low fertility appears to be related to economic conditions.
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Appendix 1
See Figs. 5, 6, 7.
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See Figs. 8, 9.
Appendix 3
See Tables 5, 6.
Appendix 4
See Table 7.
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